【本章提要：本应服务于民众的间接沟通结构，利用对沟通的掌控，不容民众对其沟通，只按自身需要沟通民众，权力由此与民众分离，为当权者私有，沟通结构异化为权组织，民众成为被组织的无权者。】
Chapter synopsis: The indirect communication structure that is supposed to serve the people, using the control of communication, does not allow the people to communicate with them, and only communicates with the people according to their own needs, so that power is separated from the people and power is private of them, and the communication structure is alienated into a power organization, and the people become the powerlessness who are organized.
从权力向前追溯，进入沟通领域，可以看到权与民分离并非是天然，在那里本是一体。早期人类的小规模氏族，首领出自氏族成员推举。可以相互充分沟通的氏族成员看得到权力实施的细节，随时发现不公。首领须得到多数成员认可，决策和分配要被群体接受，所作所为要征询成员同意……也即在权力沟通成员时，成员也能沟通权力，权力只是作为沟通工具履行功能。
Tracing back from power to the field of communication, we can see that the separation of power and people is not natural, and they were originally unity. In the small-scale clans of early humans, the leaders were elected by the clan members. The clan members who could communicate fully with each other could see the details of the power implementation and discover injustice at any time. The leader had to be approved by the majority of the members, the decision and distribution had to be accepted by the group, and the actions had to consult the members’ consent… That is, when the power communicates with the members, the members can also communicate with the power, and the power only performs its function as a communication tool.
随社会规模扩大出现间接沟通结构，氏族联合为胞族，推举负责调节氏族纠纷和主持共同活动的胞族长；胞族联合成部落，由氏族首领和胞族长推选部落头人，氏族首领和胞族长共同议事；形成的部落联盟则是由部落头人选举产生军事首领或酋长，并设议事会——人类学家描述的这种早期图景，和本文将谈的“递进自组织”颇为类似。
With the expansion of social scale, indirect communication structure emerged, clans united into phratries, and elected phratry chiefs who were responsible for mediating clan disputes and presiding over common activities; phratries united into tribes, and tribal leaders and phratry chiefs elected tribal chiefs, and clan leaders and phratry chiefs jointly deliberated; the formed tribal alliance was elected by tribal chiefs to produce military leaders or chiefs, and set up a council. This early picture described by anthropologists is quite similar to the “recursive self-organization” that this article will talk about.
直到这种间接沟通结构成为日常状态，沟通枢纽便成为固定角色。当部落或部落联盟的命运越来越取决于对外战争时，有军事天赋和功绩的首领就很难再被选举罢免，日益成为被崇拜的卡里斯马（Charisma） ——“魅力型权威”。在普通部落成员不能参加联盟会议的情况下，当首领告诉他们需要打仗或者需要交易时，他们无从参与意见。在部落命运越来越取决对外关系时，能替代去世老首领的，除了常年陪同其参与对外活动的首领之子，谁还有足够经验和人脉足以担起部落命运呢？于是有特权且世袭的阶层就这样脱颖而出。
Until this indirect communication structure became the routine, the communication hub became a fixed role. When the fate of the tribe or tribal alliance increasingly depended on external wars, the leaders with military talent and merit were difficult to be removed through electoral means, and increasingly became the worshiped charisma “charismatic authority”. When ordinary tribal members could not participate in the alliance meeting, when the leader told them that they needed to fight or trade, they had no way to participating. When the fate of the tribe increasingly depended on external relations, who else had enough experience and connections to take up the fate of the tribe except the leader’s son who accompanied him for many years to participate in external activities? So a privileged and hereditary class emerged.
当间接沟通结构上的枢纽不仅成为固定职位且被固定的人把持时，沟通结构就开始与民众分离。那些把持沟通枢纽的人会有意把间接沟通的层次和不断细化的专业分支当作藏身壁垒，制造复杂，不让民众搞懂，以切断民众对自身的沟通，不受民众制约，其上位不再通过民众，权力则用于为个人和家族谋利。
When the hubs on the indirect communication structure become fixed positions and are controlled by fixed people, the communication structure begins to separate from the people. Those who control the communication hubs will deliberately use the levels and constantly refined professional branches of indirect communication as hiding barriers, create complexity, and prevent the people from understanding, to cut off the people’s communication with themselves, not subject to the people’s constraints, their positions are no longer through the people, and power is used to seek benefits for individuals and families.
当沟通随着规模扩大和层次增加越来越复杂时，民众日益失去把握能力。不再像氏族分配猎物那般一目了然。当社会分配沿着无数环节的链条千回万转地通向金融系统、银行机构、法律体系、国际贸易、市场起落……不知哪个环节的哪个官吏躲在天书般的法典或成吨账本后面舞弊，有谁看得见，又有谁能查明？门路繁复，文牍浩瀚，叠床架屋的机构、互相虚与推诿、办一事盖上百个章的官僚程序……纵向隔层与横向机构的交错使复杂又加复杂，圈外人只能望洋兴叹。
When communication becomes more and more complex with the expansion of scale and the increase of levels, the people increasingly lose their grasp ability. It is no longer as clear as the clan distribution of prey. When social distribution follows the chain of countless links and turns thousands of times to the financial system, banking institutions, legal system, international trade, market fluctuations… who knows which link of which official hides behind the heavenly-like code or tons of books to cheat, who can see, and who can find out? The channels are complicated, the documents are vast, the institutions are stacked up, the mutual evasion and shirking, and the bureaucratic procedures of covering hundreds of stamps for one thing… The vertical separation and the horizontal intersection of institutions make the complexity more complex, and outsiders can only sigh.
在沟通结构与民一体时，沟通是为满足民众需要；当沟通结构与民分离后，沟通变为满足权力的需要。原本是社会工具的沟通结构成了社会主宰。沟通结构与民众的分离，根本标志就是民众失去对沟通结构进行沟通的可能，只剩权力对民众的单向沟通，即自上而下的统治。
When the communication structure is integrated with the people, communication is to meet the needs of the people; when the communication structure is separated from the people, communication becomes to meet the needs of power. The communication structure, which was originally a societal tool, became the societal dominator. The separation of the communication structure and the people is fundamentally marked by the fact that the people lose the possibility of communicating with the communication structure, leaving only the one-way communication of power to the people, i.e., the top-down rule.
不同领域有不同的权力，除了政治权力，还有经济、社会、文化等方面的权力。那些权力分散于不同的企业、媒体、社团。本文对权力的讨论虽然对其也适用，但不是本文重点所在。本文主要讨论覆盖整个社会的沟通结构——国家权力。
There are different kinds of power in different fields, besides political power, there are also economic, social, cultural and other aspects of power. Those powers are dispersed among different enterprises, medias, and associations. Although the discussion of power in this article is also applicable to them, it is not the focus of this article. This article mainly discusses the communication structure that covers the whole society - state power.
马基雅维利（Niccolo Machiavelli）将国家从上帝那里还原为人造的权力组织，到霍布斯、洛克（ John Locke ）、卢梭（ Jean-Jacques Rousseau）形成契约之说，近代政治解释国家起源的主流观念一直是契约论。但除了少数国家的立宪汲取了契约论因素，历史上的国家起源如果真有契约，也是权力之间的契约，而非民众之间的契约。国家的产生与其说是为公，不如说出自当权者的私营和共谋；不是为了防止恶，而正是恶的产物；不是服务民众，而是控制民众；不是为维护和平，更是为战争和征服。
Niccolo Machiavelli restored the state from God to a human-made power organization, to Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau formed the contract theory, the mainstream idea of modern politics to explain the origin of the state has always been the contract theory. But except for a few countries’ constitutions that drew on the contract theory factors, if there was really a contract in the origin of the state in history, it was also a contract between powers, not a contract between the people. The emergence of the state is not so much for the public, as it is from the private and conspiracy of the rulers; it is not to prevent evil, but the product of evil; it is not to serve the people, but to control the people; it is not to maintain peace, but to war and conquest.
从沟通角度解释国家性质可以包容其他理论，因为不管国家以何种方式产生和运作——即使是以契约，也离不开沟通。国家产生的过程是权力与民众分离的过程，是形成权组织和被组织的过程，当民众只能被组织，而组织民众的权组织覆盖在相对固定的领土上，即成为国家，该权组织即是政府。
Explaining the nature of the state from the perspective of communication can accommodate other theories, because no matter how the state is produced and operated, even by contract, the communication is also indispensable. The process of state formation is the process of separation of power and people, the process of forming power organizations and being organized. When the people can only be organized, and the power organization that organizes the people covers a relatively fixed territory, it becomes a state, and the power organization is the government.
政府是最大的权组织，在登峰造极的专制国家，政府统治一切。即使是自由国家，其他权组织也无法与政府比肩。
The government is the largest power organization, and in the most authoritarian countries, the government rules everything. Even in countries with liberal democracy, other power organizations cannot compete with the government.
沟通结构本是为社会而生。社会沟通最重要的内容之一，本应是民众对沟通结构的沟通。那种沟通包括了解沟通结构的运行，熟悉沟通枢纽即当权者的人格与能力，洞察其实施权力的意图；同时能对当权者进行监督，提出要求，并能串联其他社会成员对当权者表达反对乃至进行罢免。
The communication structure is originally for the society. One of the most important contents of social communication should be the communication of the people to the communication structure. Such communication includes understanding the operation of the communication structure, familiarizing with the personality and ability of the communication hub, that is, the ruler, and insight into its intention of exercising power; at the same time, it can supervise the ruler, make demands, and connect other societal members to express opposition or even recall the ruler.
早期氏族成员有沟通首领的能力。当社会规模扩大，出现间接沟通的层次，首领便有了利用层次切断民众对权力沟通的可能。“沟通枢纽”是有血有肉的人。人性自私的主要体现是私人占有。迄今地球上一切可分割的都被据为私有。既然离开沟通社会便不能运转，如同离开石油汽车无法开动一样，为石油不惜发动战争的人怎会不把驱动社会之车的“石油”攫为私有呢？
Early clan members had the ability to communicate with the leader. When the social scale expanded, and there were levels of indirect communication, the leader had the possibility of using the levels to cut off the people’s communication with power. The “communication hub” is a flesh-and-blood person. The main manifestation of human selfishness is private possession. Everything that can be divided on the earth has been taken as private property. Since leaving the communication society can not operate, just like leaving the oil car can not run, how can people who do not hesitate to wage war for oil not seize the “oil” that drives the car of society as private property?
当权者利用间接沟通的分层作掩护的谋私还不属于权力私有，如同有人乘月黑风高到公有土地偷了玉米，土地公有并未变。使权力真正成为私有的是权与民分离，权力成为独立的一元，才使之可被私有。
The private use of power by the rulers under the cover of of indirect communication is not yet the privatization of power, just as someone who steals corn from public land in the dark of night does not change the public ownership of the land. What makes power truly private is the separation of power and people, the power becomes an independent element, which makes it possible to be privatized.
权民分离的标志是沟通枢纽变成自上而下任命的官员。沟通结构与权力结构的区别在于，沟通结构是一体的，“上”产生自“下”，不会与“下”断裂，否则无从产生；而权力结构从上向下任命，到达不需要任命也无从任命的民众时，社会就断裂为有权和无权二元。
The sign of the separation of powers from the people is the transformation of communication hubs into officials appointed from the top down. The distinction between communication structure and power structure lies in the unity of the communication structure, where the "above" originates from the "below" and is not disconnected from it; otherwise, it cannot be generated. In contrast, the power structure appoints from the top downwards, and when it reaches the people, who do not need to be appointed and have no way of being appointed, the society breaks down into a duality of power and powerlessness.
谈到权力私有，人们首先想到的是终身制、寡头政治、腐化堕落等。那当然是权力私有的特征，但若仅局限于此，会遮蔽权力私有的实质。因为权力私有也可以不露凶残，当权者甚至力图无私地使用权力。权力是否私有，衡量在于民众能否对其沟通。当权力进行的沟通不是按照民众意愿，而是按照当权者的意愿——即使那意愿是“为人民服务”，权力也是当权者私有，不过是用私有的权力做“好事”，而且一定只会进行有利当权者的沟通，禁止不利当权者的沟通。
When it comes to the privatization of power, people first think of lifetime tenure, oligarchy, corruption and degeneration, etc. That is certainly a characteristic of the privatization of power, but if it is limited to this, it will obscure the essence of the privatization of power. Because the privatization of power can also be hidden and cruel, and the rulers even try to use power selflessly. Whether power is private or not depends on whether the people can communicate with it. When the communication of power is not according to the wishes of the people, but according to the wishes of the rulers - even if that wish is “to serve the people”, the power is also the private property of the rulers, but it is to do “good things” with the private power, and it will only carry out the communication that is beneficial to the rulers, and prohibit the communication that is unfavorable to the rulers.
权力私有也不等于终身制或世袭制。“一朝权在手，便把令来行”。不受民众沟通的权力，哪怕掌权一天，权力就一天归其私有，其第二天即遭罢免，也只能说从一个人的私有换成了另一个人的私有。
The privatization of power does not mean lifelong tenure or hereditary rule. “Once power is in hand, one can do whatever one wants.” Power that is not subject to the communication of the people, even if it is in power for one day, is privatized for one day, and if it is removed the next day, it can only be said that it has transitioned from one person’s privatization to another’s.
专制之所以成为专制、并能做到专制，主要手段就是切断社会对权力的纵向沟通，以及控制社会内部和权力内部的横向沟通。以选举为例，专制统治者看上去并不剥夺民众投票权，不造假票，有差额候选人，也搞秘密投票……其专制从哪里来呢？即在其对沟通的限制——关键是限制竞选。
The main reason why autocracy becomes autocracy and can be autocratic is that it cuts off the vertical communication of society to power and controls the horizontal communication within society and within power. Take elections as an example, authoritarian rulers do not seem to deprive the people of their right to vote, do not falsify votes, have differential candidates, and also conduct secret voting… Where does their autocracy come from? That is, in their restrictions on communication, the key is to limit the campaign.
大规模人群的选举，竞选是候选人与选民沟通的唯一方式。个人的口头表达对大规模人群影响甚微。竞选需要的沟通是两种：一是借助间接沟通的结构，如政党或竞选组织；二是借助沟通媒介，如报纸电视。专制权力则禁止“非法组织”，把媒体变成“喉舌”，有“选”无“竞”，让选民只能在专制者给出的名单上选。那样的选举即使给出再多差额，也等于是专制者的任命。
Large-scale crowd elections, campaigning is the only way for candidates to communicate with voters. Personal verbal expression has little impact on large-scale crowds. The communication required for campaigning is two: one is to use indirect communication structures, such as political parties or campaign organizations; the other is to use communication media, such as newspapers and television. Autocratic power prohibits “illegal organizations”, turns the media into “mouthpieces”, has “elections” without “competition”, and allows voters to choose only from the list given by the autocrats. Such elections, even if given more differentials, are equivalent to the appointment of autocrats.
专制权力防止造反的关键是控制沟通。切断民众获取其他信息的管道，只接受其单向沟通的宣传；用以言治罪镇压异议思想的传播；尽量让民众无知无识，彼此隔阂，无法形成共同舆论和联合力量。任何体制之外的沟通结构，哪怕只是规模大些的家族，亦会被视为对体制的威胁强行拆散。
The key to preventing rebellion by autocratic power is to control communication. Cut off the channels for the people to obtain other information, and only accept their single way communication propaganda; use speech crimes to suppress the spread of dissenting thoughts; try to make the people as ignorant and alienated as possible, unable to form a common opinion and united force. Any communication structure outside the system, even a larger family, will be forcibly dismantled as a threat to the system.
专制权力对社会各个领域，包括宗教、道德、教育的控制，主要也是从沟通角度：限制或把持宗教组织，切断宗教与真正教义的沟通，变成政权控制教民的沟通；改变不利于政权沟通民众的传统道德（如以对党的忠诚取代对家族的忠诚）；把教育变成清除多元思想的洗脑等。
Autocratic power controls various fields of society, including religion, morality, and education, mainly from the perspective of communication: restrict or control religious organizations, cut off communication between religion and true doctrine, and turn it into communication between the regime and the believers; change traditional morals that are not conducive to the communication of the regime with the people (such as replacing loyalty to the family with loyalty to the party); turn education into brainwashing that eliminates diverse thoughts, etc.
限制沟通不仅用于统治人民，也被用于控制权力。专制权力往往实行垂直管辖，不许下级之间横向沟通（自古下级官员相互“串联”都是大忌），也要防止下级官员在辖区形成独立的个人沟通。频繁调动军队将领使“将不知兵，兵不知将”，同样是为避免形成独立的沟通体系。包括不许在本籍做官的回避制度，亦是割断官员在乡土、亲族中形成的沟通网络。
Restricting communication is not only used to rule the people, but also to control power. Autocratic power often implements vertical jurisdiction, does not allow horizontal communication between subordinates (since ancient times, subordinate officials have been a taboo to “connect” with each other), and also prevents subordinate officials from forming independent personal communication in their jurisdiction. Frequent transfers of military generals make “the generals do not know the soldiers, and the soldiers do not know the generals”, which is also to avoid forming an independent communication system. Including the avoidance system that does not allow officials to serve in their hometown, it is also to cut off the communication network formed by officials in their hometown and kinship.
“分而治之”为专制权谋惯用，就在以“分”切断沟通，才能制造隔阂，挑唆戒心或敌意，然后利用沟通枢纽的地位，使“分”的各方相互制约，只接受自己沟通，得以成为发号施令者、仲裁者、平衡者…… 达到“治”的目的。
“Divide and rule” is a common tactic for autocratic power, which lies in cutting off communication by “dividing”, creating barriers, instigating suspicion or hostility, and then using the position of communication hub, making the “divided” parties restrain each other, only accepting their own communication, becoming the commander, arbitrator, balancer… to achieve the purpose of “rule”.
保密亦是对沟通的限制。专制当权者故弄玄虚，往往是让人无法了解真实状态，让下级在云山雾罩中摸不清全局，从而受其威慑，听其摆布。
Secrecy is also a restriction on communication. The autocratic rulers are mysterious, often making people unable to understand the real situation. They shroud the overall picture in mystery, leaving subordinates unable to grasp the overall situation, thus subjecting them to intimidation and manipulation.
有人对邓小平六四镇压时调动几大军区部队进京感到不解。其实调那么多军区部队主要不是为了对付手无寸铁的抗议者，而是为了在军队之间形成制衡。一个军区的部队虽然足以镇压抗议，但是同一军区无需通过中央即可自我沟通，容易串联政变。不同军区的部队则只能以中央为枢纽才可沟通。当时各军区进京部队交错部署，相互钳制，彼此摸不清对方态度和兵力，于是谁也不敢轻举妄动，加上切断社会信息进入军队的管道（不许官兵看报、听收音机等），最终使军队驯服地执行了镇压命令。
Some people are puzzled by Deng Xiaoping’s mobilization of troops from several military regions to enter Beijing during the June 4th crackdown. In fact, the main reason for mobilizing so many military regions was not to deal with the unarmed protesters, but to form a balance of power among the army. A military region’s troops were enough to suppress the protest, but the same military region could communicate with itself without going through the central government, making it easy to collude and stage a coup. Troops from different military regions could only communicate through the central hub. At that time, the troops from various military regions were deployed in a staggered manner, restraining each other, and could not figure out each other’s attitude and strength, so no one dared to act rashly. In addition, the channels for social information to enter the army were cut off (such as not allowing officers and soldiers to read newspapers, listen to radios, etc.), which eventually made the army obediently execute the suppression order.
在专制权力金字塔上，每个层次的当权者都用上述手法控制下级，也被其上级用同样手法所控制。他们对下级是主人，其权力按个人意志行使，也可为个人牟利，因此属于其个人私有；但是对上级，他们又是工具，其权力只能是上级意志的延伸，又非他私有。专制权力结构的每一层都有这种双重性，只有位于权力金字塔尖的最高统治者，整个权力结构都是其下级，向其负责，是社会权力的最终私有者。
In the autocratic power pyramid, the rulers at each level control their subordinates with the above methods, and are also controlled by their superiors with the same methods. They are masters to their subordinates, and their power is exercised according to their personal will, and can also benefit themselves, so it belongs to their personal property; but to their superiors, they are tools, and their power can only be an extension of the superior’s will, and not their own. Every level of the autocratic power structure has this duality, only the supreme ruler at the top of the power pyramid, the entire power structure is his subordinate, responsible to him, and is the ultimate owner of societal power.
千年专制权力将限制沟通的技巧发展到炉火纯青。尤其在沟通困难的超大规模社会，沟通本来就困难，限制沟通更容易。专制小国之所以政变频繁，原因之一就在于容易私下沟通。大国因为沟通不便，专制权力可以在相当长时间坚如盘石。然而一旦陷入动乱，大国不易恢复整合，也是吃亏在沟通困难。
The autocratic power of a thousand years has developed the skill of limiting communication to perfection. Especially in a super-large-scale society where communication is difficult, communication is difficult in itself, and limiting communication is easier. One of the reasons why autocratic small countries have frequent coups is that they can communicate privately. Because of the inconvenience of communication, the autocratic power of a large country can be as solid as a rock for a long time. However, once it falls into turmoil, the big country is not easy to restore unity, and also suffers from the difficulty of communication.
权力让人服从，除了出自沟通程序，的确还需强力保证。一旦有人决意不服从沟通结构与程序，就得由强力出场。然而这不与权力出自沟通的结论矛盾，因为说到底，权力的强力同样产生于沟通。
Power to make people obey, in addition to coming from the communication process, does need to be ensured by force. Once someone is determined to disobey the structures and procedures of communication, force has to be brought to bear. This, however, does not contradict the conclusion that power comes from communication, because, after all, the force of power also comes from communication.
个人的肌肉、单枪匹马的武功虽是强力，但只对闯荡江湖或打家劫舍有用。权力的强力是军队、警察、特务机关等，是联合起来分工配合的人，基础首先是组织。而组织就是沟通结构，明白这一点，强力与沟通的关系便已了然。
Individual strength, whether in terms of personal muscles or martial arts skills, may be powerful, but it is only useful for wandering the world or engaging in acts like robbery. The force of power, on the other hand, lies in institutions such as the military, police, and intelligence agencies, where people work together in coordinated roles. It's foundation is primarily organization, and organizations are fundamentally communication structures. Understanding this point clarifies the relationship between power and communication.
强力与沟通的关系，可以从人数少时看出，个人体力、武功的作用为主，随着人数增加，便取决于配合作战上看出。人数越多，对沟通的要求越高。沟通效率的不同会导致强力对比发生变化。如美军的战力主要体现在现代信息技术保障的各军种配合上，其任何一个单兵都可以和上空的飞机和海上的军舰保持畅通联系，调动他们的火力为自己所用。这种建立在充分沟通之上的多兵种协同作战能力，使其在每一个爆发战斗的具体地点总是能把多兵种火力集中在一起，实现以少制多。之所以二三百万军警就能管住十数亿乌合之众，关键也是在这里。专制政权禁止在其之外出现组织化沟通，是明白沟通能够带来对抗的力量，乃至形成强力。事实也证明，相互沟通紧密的熟人群体，实施暴力的能力总是比临时聚集的陌生人群体大得多。
The relationship between strong force and communication can be observed from the fact that when the number of people is small, the role of individual physical strength and martial arts is dominant, and as the number of people increases, it depends on the cooperation of the combat. The more people, the higher the demand for communication. The difference in communication efficiency will lead to changes in power comparison. For example, the combat power of the US military is mainly reflected in the coordination of various services guaranteed by modern information technology. Any single soldier can maintain smooth contact with the planes in the sky and the warships on the sea, and mobilize their firepower for their own use. This kind of multi-service coordinated combat capability based on sufficient communication always enables them to concentrate the firepower of multiple services at every specific location where the battle breaks out, achieving more with less. The reason why two or three million troops and police can control hundreds of millions of mobs is also here. The authoritarian regime prohibits organized communication outside of it, knowing that communication can bring the force of confrontation, and even form strong force. Facts have also proved that acquaintances who communicate closely with each other have much greater ability to implement violence than strangers who gather temporarily.
强力的另一因素是武器。武器由人研发生产，由人掌控发放，由人操作使用，因此是以人的组织沟通为基础的。而专制政权对武器的垄断正是对沟通的控制，切断民众和其他力量获得武器的可能，是导致双方强力相差悬殊的关键。尤其在冷兵器时代之后，掌握什么水平的武器，决定拥有什么程度的强力。
Another factor of strong force is weapons. Weapons are developed, produced, controlled, and operated by humans, so they are based on human organization and communication. The monopoly of weapons by the authoritarian regime is the control of communication, cutting off the possibility of the people and other forces obtaining weapons, which is the key to the huge difference in power between the two sides. Especially after the cold weapon era, what level of weapons you have determines what degree of force you have.
至于维系强力的其他因素，经费、情报、技术、培训等，相当程度都与沟通有关。所以若说权力出自强力，其实等同说权力出自沟通。
As for other factors that maintain strong force, such as funds, intelligence, technology, training, etc., they are all related to communication to a considerable extent. So if saying that power comes from strong force, it is actually equivalent to saying that power comes from communication.
有时出现专制权力与职位分离，随人而走的状态，如毛泽东“退居二线”或邓小平“彻底退休”，都不影响他们仍然是中国最有权力之人的事实。慈禧赵高之流，虽无名正言顺之位，也能把帝王置为傀儡。这种登峰造极的权力私有，从沟通角度不难解释：在专制社会中，多年充当权力结构核心枢纽的统治者，控制着所有关键的沟通管道。权力结构内的下级当权者多由其一手安插，对其有强烈的个人依附性。这时权力结构内的程序化沟通就被效忠个人的沟通所取代，即使其不在位，仍能把持这种沟通。可以说原本属于职位的沟通被其带走，继任者的沟通能力若无法超过其，就只好当傀儡。由此慈禧可以囚禁光绪，毛泽东能打倒刘少奇。林彪虽把陆海空三军首脑都换成自己心腹，但毛直接向下面的八大军区司令“打招呼”（绕过三军首脑直接沟通），司令们表示“听从主席指挥”（堵塞林的沟通，等于缴了其军权），林彪即使想造反也调动不了一兵一卒，最终葬身蒙古沙漠。
Sometimes, there is a separation between authoritarian power and official positions, with individuals holding sway regardless of their formal roles. Examples include Mao Zedong's "retirement to the second line" or Deng Xiaoping's "complete retirement," which did not diminish the fact that they remained the most powerful figures in China. Figures like Empress Dowager Cixi and Zhao Gao, although lacking official titles, could manipulate emperors as puppets. The extreme privatization of power in such cases can be explained from a communication perspective: in authoritarian societies, rulers who have long served as the central hubs of power structures control all critical communication channels. Subsequent leaders within the power structure are often handpicked by them and exhibit strong personal loyalty. In such cases, procedural communication within the power structure is replaced by communication loyal to the individual, even if they are no longer in office, they can still control this form of communication. One could say that communication that originally belonged to the position is taken away by the individual, and if the successor's communication abilities cannot surpass theirs, they are left as puppets. This is how Cixi could imprison Guangxu, and Mao Zedong could overthrow Liu Shaoqi. Although Lin Biao replaced the leaders of the army, navy, and air force with his trusted associates, Mao directly communicated with the commanders of the eight military regions "informally" (bypassing the top military leaders and communicating directly), and the commanders stated, "We obey the Chairman's command" (blocking Lin's communication, equivalent to surrendering their military authority). Even if Lin Biao had wanted to rebel, he couldn't mobilize a single soldier and was eventually buried in the Mongolian desert.
即使当时八大军区司令并不全都真心效忠毛，然而他们难以（也不敢）彼此直接沟通，毛分头进行沟通就使他们互相成为对方的钳制与威慑。比较毛和林的沟通能力，稳妥的押宝只能选择毛。
Even if at that time, not all the commanders of the eight military regions were wholeheartedly loyal to Mao, they found it difficult (and dared not) to communicate directly with each other. Mao's separate communications with each of them made them mutually constrain and deter each other. Comparing the communication abilities of Mao and Lin, a cautious bet could only favor Mao.
这种现象不仅高层有，基层也可见卸任的大小当权者阴魂不散、幕后操纵的情况，同样是倚仗在个人“辖区”经营多年形成的沟通网络。
This phenomenon is not only at the top, but also at the grassroots level. It can be seen that the former power holders of all sizes are lingering and manipulating behind the scenes, relying on the communication network formed by operating in their personal “jurisdiction” for many years.
权组织由官员和官僚（政务官与事务官、领导干部与一般干部）组成。官僚一般作为官员的辅佐（下级官员往往也被上级官员视为官僚）。
The power organization is composed of officials and bureaucrats (political and administrative officials, leading cadres and general cadres). Bureaucrats generally serve as assistants to officials (lower-level officials are often regarded as bureaucrats by higher-level officials).
随官员职位提升，辅佐其的官僚数量增加，官僚发挥的作用便越大。原本为执行权力意志而建构的官僚机器，会利用所掌握的沟通，变成具有自身意识并能自我保护的独立机体。
As officials' positions rise, the number of bureaucrats assisting them increases, and the role played by bureaucrats becomes more significant. The bureaucratic machine, originally constructed to execute the will of those in power, will utilize the communication it controls to transform into an independent entity with its own consciousness and the ability to self-protect.
二元社会类似以一个头脑管理机体上的所有细胞，官僚机器势必相当庞大，以致谁也无法弄清全貌。这使得官僚机器上的每个零件除了执行规范、完成规定动作外，别的行为都无法预期后果，任何主动性都可能导致未知后果和连锁意外，因此照章办事的教条变得至关重要。官僚不将权力机器要实行的功能作为目标，而是把机器自身的运转置于最高。尽管打破常规的主动性有时更合人情，也能把事情办得更有效，但若各个零件都有主动性，官僚机器就会分崩离析。因此官僚主义是一种对程序化沟通的坚守，是官僚机器保护自身的机制。只有如此，官僚机器才能把复杂性当作资源，而不会被复杂性毁掉自己。这使得官僚主义会像生物本能一样与权力结构形影相随。
A dualistic society is similar to managing all the cells on an organism with one mind. The bureaucratic machine is bound to be quite huge, so that no one can figure out the whole picture. This makes every part of the bureaucratic machine, except for executing norms and completing prescribed actions, unable to anticipate the consequences of other behaviors, and any initiative may lead to unknown consequences and chain accidents, so strictly following established procedures becomes crucial. Bureaucrats do not take the function that the power machine wants to implement as the goal, but put the operation of the machine itself at the highest priority. Although breaking the routine and taking the initiative is sometimes more humane and can do things more effectively, if every part has initiative, the bureaucratic machine will fall apart. Therefore, bureaucracy is a kind of adherence to procedural communication, and it is a mechanism for the bureaucratic machine to protect itself. Only in this way can the bureaucratic machine use complexity as a resource, rather than being destroyed by complexity. This makes bureaucracy always existing with the power structure like a biological instinct.
官僚主义同时是官吏为自身牟利的手段。没人比官吏更熟悉权组织，在利用复杂性设租和寻租方面，他们占有得天独厚的优势。这促使他们有意加强复杂化，将官僚机器造就成迷宫，且不轻易出示迷宫路线图。别说民众弄不明白，就连作为主人的当权者，往往少了仆人引领也会迷失，弄不清迷宫的犄角旮旯里藏着什么。
Bureaucracy is also a means for officials to profit for themselves. No one is more familiar with the power organization than the officials. They have a unique advantage in using complexity to set up and seek rents. This prompts them to deliberately increase complexity and turn the bureaucratic machine into a maze, and they do not easily show the maze map. Not to mention that the people do not understand, even as the master of the power holder, often without the servant’s guidance, they will also get lost, and do not know what is hidden in the corners of the maze.
权力意志要通过权组织具体操作——正是这一点决定了专制存在对内失效的可能性。只有在不损害官僚集团利益的前提下，专制者才有对权组织一言九鼎、说一不二的专制性。只要损害官僚集团利益，官僚群体就会用拖延、扭曲、不了了之等手段，在操作中把专制者架空，使其决策无法推动和落实。这是一种物竞天择演化形成的机制。官僚之间在具体问题上有竞争，总体却是守望相扶的共同体。他们对利益得失敏感，容易形成共识，且无需串联和组织，利用现成的官僚体系就能默契地共谋。他们的利器就是在充当承上启下的沟通环节时瞒上欺下——既可以堵塞“上”和“下”对其自身的沟通，又可以堵塞“上”和“下”相互间的沟通；既能利用复杂性为自己谋私，又能把被发现和受惩治的概率降到最低。官僚之间的密切沟通所形成的庇护网络，往往使高层当权者消灭腐败的努力落入徒劳。即使看到官僚机器的问题，因为复杂性导致的牵一发动全身，也只能头痛医头、脚痛医脚，最终使得官僚机器更加盘根错节。
The power will has to be implemented through the power organization, this is the point that determines the possibility of internal failure of autocracy. Only on the premise of not harming the interests of the bureaucratic group, the autocrat can have the totalitarianism of being decisive and unquestionable to the power organization. As long as the interests of the bureaucratic group are harmed, the bureaucratic group will use means such as delay, distortion, and oblivion to empty the autocrat in the operation, making their decisions impossible to promote and implement. This is a mechanism formed by natural selection and evolution. Bureaucrats compete with each other on specific issues, but they are a community of mutual assistance in general. They are sensitive to gains and losses, easy to form consensus, and do not need to collude and organize. They can tacitly conspire by using the existing bureaucratic system. Their weapon is to deceive and manipulate in the communication links as intermediaries between the upper and lower levels, they can block the communication to themselves, and they can also block the communication between the “upper” and the “lower”; they can use complexity to seek private gains for themselves, and they can also reduce the probability of being discovered and punished to the lowest. The shelter network formed by the close communication between bureaucrats often makes the efforts of the high-level power holders to eliminate corruption futile. Even if they see the problem of the bureaucratic machine, because of the complexity caused by the whole body, they can only treat the symptoms, and eventually make the bureaucratic machine more entangled.